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Abstract: Modern web sites serve content that browsers fetch automatically from a 
number of different web servers that may be placed anywhere in the world. Such 
content is essential for defining the appearance and behavior of a web site and is thus 
a potential target for attacks. Many public administrations offer services on the web, 
thus we have entered a world in which web sites of public interest are continuously 
and systematically depending on web servers that may be located anywhere in the 
world and are potentially under control of other governments. In this work we focus 
on these issues by investigating the content included by almost 10000 web sites of the 
Italian Public Administration. We analyse the nature of such content, its quantity, its 
geographical location, the amount of dynamic variations over time. Our analyses 
demonstrate that the perimeter of trust of the Italian Public Administration 
collectively includes countries that are well beyond the control of the Italian 
government and provides several insights useful for implementing a centralized 
monitoring service aimed at detecting anomalies. 
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1. Introduction 
Modern web sites serve content that browsers fetch automatically from a number of 
different web servers, usually associated with organizations different from the one 
associated with the web site. Such web servers may be placed anywhere in the world 
and end users do not see any explicit notification of those third-party interactions. 
Most of third-party interactions are made for purposes of user tracking and 
advertising [1], but these interactions are also often used for fetching code to be 
executed within the browser in the form of JavaScript libraries. These libraries 
provide common functionalities and simplify the development of complex web 
applications.  
Web servers that host third-party content are an attractive target for attacks, in 
particular, for attacks aimed at modifying JavaScript libraries [1-3]: First, a single 
successful attack may impact thousands of web sites; second, a successful attack 
provides almost complete control on the browsers that visit the impacted web sites; 
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third, timely detection of such attacks is very difficult. From a different point of view, 
a web site that includes external libraries may lose control of the content actually 
delivered to its clients as a result of intrusions to other sites. 
Attacks of this sort are not a theoretical possibility and have already started 
appearing. In particular, in February 2018 a cryptojacking malware was injected into 
a script used by more than 4000 web sites, including the UK’s Information 
Commissioner Office, US courts, the UK’s financial ombudsman, several Australian 
government websites [4, 5]. Similar incidents have been observed on other 
government web sites of several countries [6-8]. The behavior of government web 
sites was thus altered in a way that was hidden to both their users and their 
administrators. The motivations behind that attack were financial and the attack 
probably was carried out by a criminal organization. The underlying issue is much 
deeper and has much broader ramifications, though: what if the attack had been 
executed by a state actor? What if the objective of the attack had been introducing 
subtle alterations in the site behavior in order to undermine trust in the government 
organization behind the site? What if a coordinated and large scale attack occurred 
on many such sites? 
In other words, the security incidents mentioned above have made it manifest 
that the integrity of content and behavior of government web sites may depend on the 
integrity of many other sites belonging to administration domains fully disjoint from 
those of the government. The fact that third-party content may be located anywhere 
in the world makes these issues especially critical: the government of the territory in 
which third-party content happens to be located could force specific changes to that 
content, perhaps tailored to specific web sites or countries that use that content. We 
have thus entered a world in which government web sites are continuously and 
systematically depending on web sites that are beyond control of the government and 
that may even be under control of other governments. Indeed, a recent report by the 
NATO Cooperative Cyber-Defence Center of Excellence points out that “one of the 
least explored areas of cyber vulnerabilities concerns cross-border dependencies of 
critical information infrastructure” and that “cross-border dependencies create 
additional vulnerabilities and a potential source of instability even for countries that 
have addressed these issues domestically” [9]. On the other hand, the legal 
frameworks necessary for providing concrete end operational guidelines suitable for 
these novel forms of dependence are often still excessively vague [10]. 
It is crucial to emphasize that the tight dependence induced by the inclusions of 
web resources is intrinsically different from the one associated with the supply chain 
of hardware and software components [11], because changes in third-party content 
included by web sites can be executed much more quickly and with much less 
planning. Furthermore, subtle modifications in third-party content can be targeted, 
applied and undone at will, unlike modifications in hardware and software 
components. 
In this work we focus on these issues and investigate the potential risks 
associated with government web sites, based on a large scale analysis of almost  
10000 web sites of the Italian Public Administration. Specifically, we investigate the 
nature of the content obtained from other sites, the number of those sites and their 
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geographical location, i.e., whether they are abroad and in which countries. The 
nature of the content obtained from other sites determines the kind of attacks that can 
be executed. Scripts is the potentially more dangerous content category: Depending 
on how the script is used by the including web page, a script may change the 
appearance of the site using that script completely. Images can be misused, 
essentially, only for attempting to inject malware in the browser, by exploiting 
possible browser vulnerabilities related to image rendering. The number of sites that 
are automatically contacted by the browser for assembling the content of a given site 
indicates the number of different targets potentially available for attacking that site. 
Finally, the countries where those targets are located highlight the implicit 
dependencies for ensuring integrity of content and behavior of the main site. For 
example, the fact that a site of the Italian Public Administration serves third-party 
content from web servers located in Russia, and Israel is certainly a relevant 
information from a strategic point of view. 
We also investigate the temporal changes in third-party content, with the aim of 
assessing the feasibility of a monitoring service capable of detecting any anomaly in 
the content served by a web site automatically. Defensive services of this kind can be 
implemented in the cloud in the form of Software as a Service [12] and have been 
proposed for providing a systematic, continuous monitoring of the visible contents of 
a web site, i.e., as a defense toward defacements [13-17]. The framework consists in 
observing the visible content of a web site, first for constructing a profile capturing 
the dynamic variability of the site, and then for notifying the site administrator of any 
observed anomaly with respect to the site-specific profile. Such services are 
potentially very useful because they can monitor a large set of web sites 
automatically, without any need of installing dedicated software in the sites to be 
monitored or of providing any site-specific service configuration. Our investigation 
allows gaining insights into the possibility of implementing similar frameworks for 
monitoring the integrity of third-party resources, i.e., of components which 
determine the site behavior beyond its visible appearance. A key problem along this 
path consists in assessing the number and the frequency of changes for third-party 
resources. If most web sites change most of their third-party resources every few 
days, then an automatic and site-agnostic monitoring service may be very hard to 
implement in practice. On the other hand, if changes in third-party resources do not 
occur frequently, then notifying site administrators in order to verify the genuinity of 
the change could be feasible. Extensions to the HTTP protocol have been defined 
which allow the administrator of a web site to specify the approved sources and 
content for resources to be included in that site, in the form of content security 
policies contained in HTTP responses [18]. When connecting to a web site, a browser 
will apply any content security policy previously received from that site and will thus 
use only resources explicitly whitelisted (approved) by the administrator. Recent 
studies have demonstrated that very few sites actually use content security policies 
[19-21], though, which makes the need for an external and zero-configuration 
monitoring service even more evident.  
As an aside, our interest in this research was triggered by the fact that a 
malicious script located in Singapore was found on the site of the Italian Agency for 
 97 
the Evaluation of Universities. That script remained unnoticed for an unknown 
interval until it was spotted by a media outlet [22]. A monitoring service like the one 
we are devising would have been able to detect such a script extremely quickly, even 
without the need of solving the difficult problem of classifying the script as malicious 
– more precisely, site administrators would have been promptly notified of the 
presence in the site of an anomaly, in the form of a never seen before script located 
in Singapore. 
Although we are not aware of any work with a focus similar to ours, the web 
security community has long recognized the risks intrinsic in the inclusion of 
resources from remote servers. A significant work in this area is [1], which analyzed 
a large-scale crawl of the top 10000 sites in the Alexa ranking worldwide and 
identified the trust relationships of these sites with their library providers. The 
feasibility of attempting to uncover malicious content by comparing two versions of 
the same site has been proven in [23], which also discovered previously unknown 
infection campaigns. The attack vectors made possible by JavaScript libraries 
included by many web sites have been analyzed in [24]. Techniques for whitelisting 
safe scripts automatically in web sites with dynamically changing content have been 
proposed in [25]. 
2. Data collection and methodology 
We used a dataset consisting of 9846 web sites obtained from the Italian National 
Index of the Public Administration (https://www.indicepa.gov.it). Many of these 
sites satisfy the definition of “information infrastructures of national interest” 
provided by the Italian Government [9]. We have not quantified this figure exactly 
because the corresponding requirements are rather high level and cannot be extracted 
automatically. 
We performed a static analysis based on one observation of the home page of 
each site and a dynamic analysis based on four observations of each home page taken 
approximately 10 days from each other. For each observation, we stored information 
for describing all the web resources that the browser automatically fetches for 
rendering that observation. For each resource, we stored what follows (we actually 
stored more information and list here only the pieces relevant to the presented 
analysis). 
● Resource type: Obtained from the HTML element that provoked the 
automatic download of the resource, one of: <audio>, <embed>, <iframe>, 
<img>, <link>, <object>, <script>, <track>, <video>. 
● Final URL: Web address from which the resource was downloaded (an 
HTTP request for a resource at a given URL may receive a redirection HTTP 
response, i.e., a response indicating that the resource should be requested at a 
different URL, specified in the response itself; in this case the browser sends an 
HTTP request for the new URL automatically; the new request may in its turn receive 
a further indirection response). 
● Resource hash: A hash of the resource content. This information allows to 
efficiently detect whether the content of a given resource has changed in different 
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observations of the same home page, as well as whether the same resource is part of 
the content of different home pages. 
● IP server: IP address of the server from which the resource was downloaded. 
When analyzing resource types, we avoided to make any hypothesis on the 
attack vector, attack objective, nature of the attackers. We considered all resources as 
a potential risk and only emphasize that scripts constitute the potentially more 
dangerous content category. We provide some background on this fact below, for 
completeness of presentation. 
Depending on how a script is used by including a web page, the script may alter 
the behavior of the web page completely (in the case of the cryptojacking incident 
previously mentioned, the script augmented the behavior of the web site with a 
cryptomining routine). Such alteration may include changing the appearance of the 
site using that script completely and altering the data exchanged between the browser 
and the site. In other scenarios a script may steal data obtained from the site, i.e., send 
those data at an attacker-controlled location. In all scenarios, a script may force the 
browser to exchange data with an attacker-controlled server: such drive-by attacks 
are aimed at injecting malware in the browser by exploiting browser vulnerabilities 
[26]. Drive-by attacks are very common and are the basis, for example, of the so-
called malvertising, i.e., injection of malware in browsers by means of malicious 
advertisements [27-30]. Resources of type iframe are, essentially, equivalent to 
scripts used for drive-by attacks [31, 32]. The other resource types can be misused 
only for attempting to inject malware in the browser, by exploiting vulnerabilities in 
the browser code for handling the corresponding resources [33-36]. 
3. Results and discussion 
3.1. Static analysis 
In this section we report on data obtained by analysing only one observation of the 
content of the web sites. We defined the following regions whose names are self-
explanatory: Italy, OutsideItaly, OutsideEU, OutsideED-US. Of course, OutsideItaly 
is a superset of OutsideEU and the latter is a superset of OutsideEU-US. We 
geolocated servers based on their IP address and associated each web site with two 
regions, as follows. The real region is the one where the server hosting the main page 
of the web site is located; the virtual region is determined by the location of the 
servers hosting the resources that are included by that web site: 
● Italy: All the content is obtained from servers located in Italy. 
● OutsideItaly: At least a resource is obtained from a server located outside of 
Italy. 
● OutsideEU: At least a resource is obtained from a server located outside of 
the European Union. 
● OutsideEU-US: At least a resource is obtained from a server located outside 
of the European Union and of the United States. 
The composition of our dataset with respect to the geolocation of web sites is in 
Table 1 (columns real and virtual). It is interesting to note that 1687 web sites (17.1%) 
are located outside of Italy, with 319 web sites (3.9%) outside of the EU. It is even 
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more interesting to note that the virtual location is OutsideItaly for 8007 web sites 
(81.3%): the vast majority of sites of the Italian Public Administration indeed rely on 
resources that are located outside of Italy. Furthermore, 78.8% of the sites have a 
virtual location in the OutsideEU region and 10.2% in the OutsideEU-US region. 
Interestingly, by looking at the raw data in more detail, we found that 1318 web sites 
(13.4%) do not include any resource from Italy. 
For each web site, we counted the resources included by the site that are in the 
same virtual region as the site itself (e.g., for a web site in virtual region OutsideEU, 
we counted resources hosted in servers located outside the EU). The basic indexes of 
the corresponding distributions (average, median, 90th percentile, maximum) are 
given in Table 1; the All row shows the indexes for all the sites considered in our 
study. The numerical values of these indexes confirm that there is indeed a substantial 
dependence of sites in our dataset from content located outside of Italy. 
Table 1. Dataset description. Statistic indexes are for resources in the same virtual region as the site 
Region Real Virtual Average Median 90th percentile Maximum 
Italy 8159 1839 39 36 70 1607 
OutsideItaly 1687 8007 15 4 52 266 
OutsideEU 319 7759 6 3 11 263 
OutsideEU-US 29 1007 2 0 1 61 
All 9846 9846 58 53 96 1607 
We looked at the first 10 sites for number of resources located outside of Italy 
and found that all those sites correspond to public schools, with only one exception 
corresponding to a local professional association (10th position in this list, with 172 
resources located outside of Italy). We believe such large values (more than twice the 
90th percentile) should be considered as a form of anomaly to be notified to site 
administrators in order to verify the legitimacy of so many inclusions. 
The previous data determined the virtual region of web sites by considering all 
resources are being equivalent. Next, we considered the type of the resource because 
this property determines the potential risk associated with the resource. The results 
are in Table 1. For example, the first row indicates that 66% of the web sites requires 
downloading a script from outside of Italy. The most important finding is that reliance 
of scripts located outside of Italy is indeed a crucial phenomenon in our dataset. 
By looking at the figures for the three categories, it can be seen that most of the 
scripts located outside of Italy are located in the US. This fact may be explained by 
the wide diffusion of scripts for tracking visitors to web sites that are generally 
provided by US-based companies. It is important to remark that only 0.42% of web 
sites rely on scripts located outside of the European Union and of the United States. 
From a different point of view, scripts located outside of the EU and the US may be 
seen as anomalies and a monitoring service could signal anomalies of this kind to the 
site administrators. Similar remarks can be made for resources of the other types, with 
the observation that site administrators should prioritize the analysis of scripts as they 
are the most dangerous resource type. Furthermore, even the mere presence of either 
audio or video content may be seen as an anomaly irrespective of the location of the 
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content. Notifying site administrators of the presence of such content in order to 
verify whether it is indeed supposed to be present may be important: since certain 
video engines used by browsers are frequently affected by newly discovered 
vulnerabilities, a fraudulent insertion of a video component in a web site may be an 
effective way for distributing malware on visitors of that web site. 
Table 2. Regions of resource types 
Resource type OutsideItaly OutsideEU OutsideEU-US 
Script 66% 60% 0.42% 
Link 52% 48% 1% 
Object 0.48% 0.23% 0% 
Img 36% 24% 0.46% 
Iframe 21% 11% 0.081% 
Form 13% 2.4% 0.21% 
Embed 0.34% 0.21% 0.40% 
Audio 0.081% 0.081% 0% 
Video 0.35% 0.34% 0% 
We then considered the countries from which the resources are obtained.  
Table 2 lists all those countries, along with the number of sites that use content 
located in each country. We believe that the size and composition of the set of those 
countries is rather surprising, as one would have hardly expected that sites in the 
Italian Public Administration depend on such a large and broad set of countries.  
Furthermore, the number of sites that obtain at least one resource from Italy is 
significantly smaller than our dataset (8528 vs. 9846): It follows than more than 1300 
sites do not obtain any resource from Italy. We inspected a sample of those sites and 
observed that they mostly obtain resources from France, Ireland and the US. 
It is also interesting to observe the presence of countries which do not belong to 
the NATO alliance and that one would not expect to be routinely serving content for 
sites of the Italian Public Administration (e.g., Japan, Israel, Russia, China, India, 
Ukraine, Seychelles Islands). Indeed, since those countries are not used by many 
sites, one could consider those countries as a form of anomaly to be notified to site 
administrators in order to verify whether content from those countries is indeed 
supposed to be present. 
We inspected some of the sites using resources from these countries and we 
found that several of those sites redirected to online shops selling shoes and similar 
goods of fashion brands. For example, a certain URL (that we prefer to omit) is 
redirected to a web site that is apparently selling Hogan shoes at the URL 
http://www.hoganscerpeoutlet.com/. This URL is a form of typosquatting as the 
Italian word for “shoes” is “scarpe” while the URL contains “scerpe”. We did not 
analyze whether those sites are legitimate sites and whether they are an authorized 
reseller of the brand. We interpret this result as a staleness of data in the Italian Index 
of the Public Administration: the legitimate web site changed URL without reflecting 
the new URL in the index; the previous URL was somehow acquired by another 
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organization, either by buying the domain name of the previous URL or by means of 
a fraudulent intrusion in a server that is no longer maintained but is still active. 
Table 3. Sites with content in the corresponding country 
Country Number of sites Country Number of sites 
Italy 8528 Japan 7 
United States 7687 Spain 7 
Ireland 1092 Israel 6 
Netherlands 1031 Turkey 4 
Canada 1002 Russia 4 
France 598 Belgium 3 
Germany 532 track 3 
United Kingdom 317 Luxembourg 3 
Austria 79 Denmark 2 
Switzerland 15 China 2 
Croatia 13 San Marino 2 
British Virgin Island 11 Australia 2 
Seychelles 10 Estonia 2 
Sweden 9 Slovenia 2 
Bulgaria 9 India 2 
Czechia 9 Ukraine 1 
We visually inspected a few tens of sites using resources from countries that do 
not belong to the NATO alliance. Such sites used 120 resources from those countries, 
including 69 scripts. Approximately 40% of the inspected sites turned out to be online 
shops selling goods of differing nature, from shoes to football shirts. Interestingly, 
we found that the median number of resources in legitimate sites and non-legitimate 
sites was 4 and 128, respectively. These figures could also be used for tuning forms 
of anomaly detectors. 
We then analyzed which scripts are obtained from different countries. We 
considered two scripts as being equal if they have the same hash and counted the 
number of different countries from which the same script is obtained. Table 3 
contains the information corresponding to the 10 scripts obtained from the largest 
number of countries, e.g., the first row corresponds to a script obtained from 14 
different countries and used by 1090 different web sites. 
Figures in Table 3 illustrate that web sites tend to refer to widely differing 
locations even when they need to use the very same script content. This fact multiplies 
the number of potential targets of interest for an attacker, i.e., of locations that could 
be attacked for modifying a given script. From a different point of view, the fact that 
different sites in the Italian Public Administration may direct their visitors to as many 
as 14 different countries for obtaining the very same script is quite odd, at least in 
principle. 
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Table 4. Scripts obtained from the largest number of different countries 
Number of countries Number of sites 
14 1090 
14 1421 
14 2259 
12 1351 
11 1005 
11 43 
10 143 
10 143 
9 652 
9 34 
The fact that a given script be obtained from different countries may be an 
unavoidable effect of modern web technology that is beyond the control of web site 
administrators. For example, a large number of web sites could refer a script with the 
same URL and that URL could be resolved to web servers located in different 
countries by load balancing policies implemented within the name-to-IP address 
mapping infrastructure (i.e., the DNS). We ascertained that this is indeed what 
happens for the script associated with the first row of Table 3, which corresponds to 
https://fonts.googleapis.com. On the other hand, the administrators of different web 
sites could even refer to different repositories of the same script library. 
It is worth pointing out is that the median and 90th percentile of the number of 
different countries from which a given script is obtained are 2 and 4, respectively. 
Thus, the phenomenon of identical scripts obtained from different countries is very 
common, although the number of different locations from which the same script is 
obtained is generally small. These figures could be used by a centralized service 
monitoring the integrity of the full set of web sites in order to assess the risk 
associated with scripts obtained from many different countries (such as those in  
Table 3) and possibly coordinate the access to the same script from different web 
sites. 
Table 5. Sites with content not legitimate uncovered with script distribution anomalies 
Number of sites Countries Additional countries 
3 Turkey, Seychelles, Estonia  
4 Turkey, Seychelles, Estonia  
5 Turkey, Seychelles, Sweden US 
8 Turkey, Seychelles Italy, US 
Another kind of anomaly analysis may be based on scripts that are obtained 
from few countries and such that those countries are used by few sites. The rationale 
for this analysis is that scripts obtained from few countries are unlikely to correspond 
to widely used libraries, while countries that are used by few sites are unlikely to host 
widely used computing infrastructures. In other words, such analysis could uncover 
attacks relying on “unusual” scripts in “unusual” countries. Based on these 
considerations, we could find relatively quickly 4 scripts used only by 19 sites whose 
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content is clearly not legitimate (see Table 5, one row for each script). Interestingly, 
the script in the last row was found in seven sites that have become shopping sites 
and one site of a major Italian University. The script in the 3rd row was located also 
in the US while the one in the 4th row was located also in the US and in Italy. 
3.2. Dynamic analysis 
In this section we report on data obtained by analysing the variations between two 
consecutive observations of the same web site. Let r be a resource of type t, let v1 be 
an observation of a web site and let v2 be the next observation of that web site. We 
say that there is a variation between v1 and v2 when r is in v1 but not in v2, or when r 
is in v2 but not in v1, or when r is in both observations with the same URL but different 
content. We counted the variations across all the consecutive observations available 
and summarized the results in Table 6, separately for each resource type. In order to 
place these figures in perspective, the table contains also the statistical indexes 
computed statically. For example, in 90% of the consecutive observations of the same 
web sites, there are at most 5 scripts that change; and, in 90% of the web sites, there 
are at most 38 scripts. 
Table 6. Resources for each web site (static) and variations between consecutive observations (Δ) 
Type 
Average Median 90th percentile Maximum 
Δ Static Δ Static Δ Static Δ Static 
Any 7 58 7 53 14 96 248 1607 
Script 2 21 1 18 5 38 102 1597 
Link 2 12 1 9 4 25 109 124 
Object 0.03 0.05 0 0 0 0 10 10 
Img 2 24 1 20 5 44 130 1041 
Iframe 0.50 0.6 0 0 1 2 36 48 
Form 0.90 1 1 1 2 2 12 13 
Embed 0 0.02 0 0 0 0 1 7 
Audio 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Video 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 5 
 
We believe these results are important because they clearly illustrate that 
changes in the considered resources are quite unlikely events. It follows that, for 
many sites, a monitoring infrastructure which considers any change in those resources 
as an anomaly to be investigated by site administrators could be practically feasible 
and, most importantly, very useful. For other sites, the changes that should be notified 
and investigated could be filtered based on a profile of the observed site constructed 
automatically in a preliminary learning phase. An infrastructure that monitors a large 
set of the Italian Public Administration could even correlate the observed changes 
across different sites and use the corresponding information appropriately, either in a 
centralized way or by forwarding the information to the site administrators. 
The distribution of variations between consecutive observations exhibits a long 
tail: The 10 sites with the largest number of variations between consecutive 
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observations have between 205 and 730 variations. Although such values are not, by 
themselves, indicative of any security-related problem, we believe they are so large 
to be considered as anomalies that should be investigated by site administrators. 
3.3. Analysis for selected categories 
We repeated some of the previous analyses on three significant subsets of our dataset, 
one containing Municipalities, one containing Ministries, one containing Hospitals. 
We constructed these subsets with a keyword-based heuristics applied to URL and 
names of web sites. The size of the resulting subsets was 4282, 7 and 32, respectively. 
Although these sizes may be too small to derive general conclusions, the 
corresponding data provide interesting insights. The categorization of web sites based 
on geolocation of resources (Table 7) confirms that reliance on resources located 
outside of Italy is an essential feature of the analysed subsets.  
Table 7. Statistics of resources included by selected web site categories 
 Municipalities Ministries Hospitals All 
OutsideItaly 
Number of sites 79% 86% 75% 81% 
Median 12 9 20 15 
Maximum 215 30 75 266 
OutsideEU 
Number of sites 76% 86% 69% 79% 
Median 5 9 4 6 
Maximum 105 30 14 263 
OutsideEU-US 
Number of sites 3% 0% 9% 10% 
Median 3 0 1 2 
Maximum 49 0 1 61 
Interestingly, none of the Ministries web sites in our subset includes resources 
located outside of the European Union and the United States. We looked at the list of 
countries in detail and we found that Hospitals, Ministries and Municipalities use 
resources from increasingly larger sets of countries: Hospitals use resources from 
Italy, US, The Netherlands, UK; Ministries use resources also from Canada, France, 
Germany; Municipalities use resources also from Ireland, Austria, Canada, 
Switzerland, Japan, Croatia, Bulgaria, Czechia, Slovenia, British Virgin Islands, 
Luxembourg, Spain, Russia. In other words, these data suggest that Hospitals and 
Ministries tend to depend on a set of countries much smaller and restricted to the EU 
than Municipalities. 
The phenomenon of a same script obtained from many different countries, 
thereby augmenting the number of potential targets of interest for an attacker, is 
present also in the three categories Municipalities, Ministries and Hospitals, as 
illustrated in Table 8. 
Variations between consecutive observations are summarized in Table 9, 
separately for each resource type. These data illustrate the benefits that may be 
obtained by tailoring the anomaly definition to the profile of each individual site, as 
it can be seen that the variations do depend on the site category. In all cases, though, 
the median number of variations is very small for each category, thereby confirming 
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that even the simple approach of notifying site administrators of each variation may 
be practical and effective for a large quantity of web sites.  
Table 8. Scripts obtained from the largest number of different countries, for different categories of sites 
Municipalities Ministries Hospitals 
Number of 
countries 
Number of 
sites 
Number of 
countries 
Number of 
sites 
Number of 
countries 
Number of 
sites 
14 525 14 1 14 5 
14 208 8 1 14 7 
14 368 8 1 14 3 
12 188 8 1 12 1 
11 124 8 1 9 1 
11 1 7 1 8 2 
10 33 7 1 8 3 
10 70 6 1 8 2 
9 38 6 1 8 1 
8 15 5 1 8 1 
Table 9. Variations between observations, for each web site category 
Resource type Municipalities Ministries Hospitals 
Median 90th Median 90th Median 90th 
Script 1 6 2 9 1 4 
Link 1 3 3 10 1 3 
Object 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Img 1 5 3 7 0 5 
Iframe 0 2 0 2 0 1 
Form 0 2 1 2 0 2 
Embed 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Audio 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Video 0 0 0 0 0 0 
The distribution of variations between consecutive observations exhibits a long 
tail: The 10 sites with the largest number of variations between consecutive 
observations have between 205 and 730 variations. Although such values are not, by 
themselves, indicative of any security-related problem, we believe they are so large 
to be considered as anomalies that should be investigated by site administrators. 
3.4. Applicability of the findings to other countries 
A study of the web sites of the Public Administration of other countries is beyond the 
scope of this work. However, we repeated some of the previous analyses on a small 
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sample of web sites of the Public Administration of the United Kingdom, selected 
from https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations. Although these additional 
data are clearly not a substitute for a broader and more complete assessment, they 
suggest that the issues emerging from our study are indeed of general interest. In this 
respect, it may be useful to observe that a large-scale analysis of the defensive 
security mechanisms adopted by more than 22,000 web sites in 28 EU countries, 
could not find any significative difference between the “security score” of web sites 
in different countries [37]. 
Table 10. Statistics for a sample of UK web sites 
Region Real Virtual Average Median 90th percentile Maximum 
UK 29 2 5 5 6 7 
OutsideUK 21 48 19 8 45 102 
OutsideEU 13 48 13 6 42 98 
OutsideEU-US 0 6 1 1 1 1 
All 50 2 37 38 58 105 
Table 11. Variations between consecutive observations for resource type (UK) 
Resource type Average Median 90th percentile Maximum 
Any 22 23 33 54 
Script 11 11 16 26 
Link 5 4 11 17 
Object 0 0 0 0 
Img 4 2 8 20 
Iframe 0.50 0 2 5 
Form 0.80 1 2 3 
Embed 0 0 0 0 
Audio 0 0 0 0 
Video 0 0 0 0 
Specifically, Table 10 summarizes the real and virtual regions of web sites and 
of the included content, with the same schema as in Table 1. These figures confirm 
the presence of sites of the Public Administration located outside of the country, as 
well as a substantial dependence from content (i.e., resources) also located outside of 
the country. Variations between consecutive observations are summarized in  
Table 11, with the same schema as in Table 6. Also in this case we observe that there 
is a moderate amount of variations between consecutive observations, albeit higher 
than for the Italian Public Administration. This fact would have to be taken into 
account for automatically constructing global and site-specific profiles for a 
monitoring service. 
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4. Concluding remarks 
The main findings of our analysis may be summarized as follows: 
● Web sites of the Italian Public Administration indeed depend implicitly on 
servers that are beyond their administrative control and, most importantly, that are 
located in other countries. Such web sites are thus continuously and systematically 
depending on servers that might be under hidden control of other governments. 
● A centralized monitoring service may have several practically feasible 
strategies for notifying site administrators of anomalies worth investigating. Such 
strategies may be based on global profiles constructed on the full set of monitored 
sites, for example the 90th percentile of numerical quantities or the set of countries 
accessed by 90% of the sites, as well as on profiles automatically tailored to each 
single web site. 
● The practical absence of certain resource types in our dataset, for example 
audio and video content, may allow more aggressive definitions of anomalies. Similar 
considerations could be made, for example, on the sets of countries involved in 
providing a web site content. 
● Web sites of the Italian Public Administration tend to refer to widely differing 
locations even when they need to use the very same script content: visitors of different 
sites may be directed to as many as 14 different countries for obtaining the very same 
script. While this fact might be unavoidable, it also multiplies the number of potential 
targets of interest for an attacker and thus constitutes an issue that could be effectively 
monitored by a centralized service. 
A realistic assessment of the effective risk for the Italian society as a whole 
cannot be obtained on the sole basis of our data and requires further work, in 
particular, with the analysis of more pages for each web site, with a more granular 
view of script usage by web sites, with a scrutiny of the interdependencies between 
the computing infrastructures of the various organizations [38] and with an 
assessment of  the operational security practices followed by each organization 
(similarly, e.g., to [39]). We plan to broaden our investigation by attempting to 
uncover possible correlations between the nature of resource inclusions by web sites 
and the content of those sites, by looking for similarities that should emerge from 
unsupervised analysis of large collections of web content [40-43]. We believe that 
analyses of this kind may provide important insights for the implementation of a 
centralized monitoring service. 
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